Studies on affordance perception commonly report systematic errors; a finding that is at odds with the observation that everyday motor behavior is accurate. The present study investigated whether the means by which perceptual performance is measured could explain the reported errors. Perception of overhead reachability and reaction time were measured using a verbal and an actual reaching response in a standing reach, and a reach-and-jump. Results show that participants accurately perceived their action boundaries for both tasks and in both response conditions. A simple reach, however, took less time to initiate (1,094 ms) than a reach-and jump (1,214 ms). Interestingly, the verbal response took considerably more time to initiate (1,424 ms) than the actual reach (1,154 ms). These results suggest that making verbal judgments about affordances is a different task than actually acting on them. It is therefore concluded that the use of conscious judgments to measure perceptual performance should be considered with care.
The ecological approach to action proposes that performers of coordinated movement perceive and act on opportunities for action, that is, they perceive and act on affordances (Gibson, 1977 (Gibson, , 1986 ; see also Michaels & Carello, 1981; Stoffregen, 2000; Turvey, 1992; Turvey, Shaw, Reed, & Mace, 1981) . Affordances are relations between environmental properties and properties of a performer that have consequences for behavior (Sanders, 1997; Stoffregen, 2000) . Perception, it is argued, is the detection of information-specifying affordances. The theory of affordances is firmly based on a dual interdependence of perception and action; affordances are the primary objects of perception and action is the realization of affordances. Numerous studies have shown that humans and other animals perceive affordances. Warren (1984) , for example, demonstrated that people can perceive affordances for stair climbing. The ability of a given person to ascend a given set of stairs is a function of the height of each stair relative to the length of the person's legs. Warren showed that participants can very accurately detect this constraining relation between leg length and riser height that determines the affordance of stair climbing. Similarly, infants can perceive whether a surface is rigid enough relative to their weight for it to afford stance and traversal (Gibson et al., 1987) , and adults can perceive whether a doorway affords passage relative to their shoulder width (Warren & Whang, 1987) or a chair or table affords sitting on relative to their leg length and eye height (Mark, 1987; Mark, Balliett, Craver, Douglas, & Fox, 1990; Mark & Vogele, 1987) .
Perception of affordances is said to be direct, in the sense that there are no intermediate stages between specification of an affordance and perception of the affordance. If available perceptual information is specific to reality and if perception is direct, then we would ordinarily expect perception to be accurate. Studies on the perception of affordances, however, commonly report systematic perceptual errors, including both underestimation (e.g., Mark, 1987; Pepping & Li, 2000a; Pufall & Dunbar, 1992) and overestimation (e.g., Bootsma, Bakker, van Snippenberg, & Tdlohreg, 1992; Carello, Grosofsky, Reichel, Solomon, & Turvey, 1989; Pepping & Li, 2000a , 2000b . These systematic errors seem at odds with the observation that everyday motor behavior-such as walking, sitting, reaching, and catching-is not associated with systematic errors of judgment. Furthermore, the reported systematic errors in studies on affordances are incompatible with the notion that affordances are perceived directly. Warren and Whang (1987) asked for judgments of minimum door width that would afford passage for a person without rotation of their torso. The actual minimum width of a door affording this type of passage should be equal to shoulder width, but Warren and Whang found consistent judgments at about 1.3 shoulder widths. This overestimation of action boundaries was interpreted as a "safety margin," an interpretation that has been applied elsewhere in the affordance literature; in particular in studies where "safety" could be considered an issue, as in stepping across gaps in the floor (Jiang & Mark, 1994; Mark, Jiang, King, & Paasche, 1999; Pufall & Dunbar, 1992) . The safety margin interpretation of (over) estimation is valid in tasks where safety is an issue and over-or underestimation results in a successful action. It cannot, however, explain the systematic over-and underestimation in studies on actions that require a certain amount of accuracy for them to be successful, such as reaching (Bootsma et al., 1992; Carello et al., 1989) and pointing (Pagano & Bingham, 1998) . It is this kind of systematic error that is the topic of the present study.
A finding of particular relevance is that individuals can perceive when a ball is within a certain height relative to their own reaching capabilities for it to afford reaching. In several studies on overhead reaching, Pepping and Li (1997; 2000a; 2000b) have shown that the maximum ball height that novice individuals verbally judged to be reachable matched very well with the height that they were actually capable of reaching. In a number of experiments, individuals were asked to judge their maximum abilities for overhead reaching (ranging from a normal standing reach to reach-and-jumping) while their actual physical overhead reaching abilities were altered. For example, in one experimental condition participants wore a weighted belt which yielded a reduction in maximum jump height of about 2%. In another experiment in the same study (Pepping & Li, 2000a) , the reach-and-jump task was performed on a trampoline, which increased maximum jump height by about 22%. Across these manipulations perception of affordances for overhead reachability was preserved, that is, participants judged reasonably correctly the magnitude that their abilities had changed; an effect similar to that reported by Mark (1987) in the context of altered capacities for stair climbing and sitting. Pepping and Li concluded that perception of the limits of reaching space change in accord with alterations of the dynamics of the performer-environment system for overhead reaching. In line with the above-reported findings, however, the studies performed by Pepping and Li (1997; 2000a; 2000b) recount that the perceptual judgments of overhead reachability were accompanied by systematic errors. Depending on the experimental condition, participants under-or overestimated the height they could actually reach by 0.5-3%. Rochat and Wraga (1997) offered an account concerning the origin of systematic errors in affordance judgments that emphasized the role of body posture as a factor influencing the perception of reachability. In short, they argued that, in situations with constrained effectivities-the ability to take advantage of a particular affordance (Turvey & Shaw, 1979) -the performer overestimates the limits of reaching space systematically because they are calibrated in reference to multiple behavioral degrees of freedom. Rochat and Wraga presented a number of experiments in which participants made verbal judgments about the reachability of an object placed in front of them. The results showed that estimation errors got smaller when participants were allowed to use multiple degrees of freedom in their judgments. In other words, judgments based on a reach using only one degree of freedom, movements around the shoulder, resulted in systematic errors (overestimation) that were larger than judgments based on a reach using multiple degrees of freedom (whole body movements).
Another account of the origin of systematic errors focuses on the experimental task used to measure perceptual performance. Perception of affordances, including the study by Rochat and Wraga reported earlier, is commonly measured using perceptual judgment tasks (see, for example, Bootsma et al., 1992; Carello et al., 1989; Mark, 1987; Pepping & Li, 2000a , 2000b Pufall & Dunbar, 1992; Rochat & Wraga, 1997; Stoffregen, Gorday, Sheng, & Flynn, 1999; Warren, 1984) . Participants are asked to provide conscious, often verbal, reports about whether they are able to do something. For example, in Rochat and Wraga's (1997) study participants gave yes/no judgments about whether a ball was reachable. Hence, the accuracy of the perception of action capabilities is measured in terms of the participants' ability to report it, rather than in terms of their ability to control the action in question. Bootsma (1989) , addressing the validity of the tasks used in perception studies, performed an experiment in which participants had to either hit a free-falling ball, or press a button to indicate when the ball would pass a certain position (see also McLeod, McLaughlin & Nimmo-Smith, 1986) . Results showed that variability of the temporal initiation point of the different tasks was smaller when participants hit the ball. Bootsma argued that "if perception is for doing, … , then the more 'what has to be done' is separated from the situations in which perception-action systems evolved, the more inaccurate perceptual processes subserving the required perception-action coupling are likely to be" (p. 492). Heft (1993) introduced a distinction between two types of judgment: perceptual judgments and analytical judgments. The first are based on skilled, unreflective perception-action processes and commonly are quite accurate. On the other hand, analytical judgments or conscious reports (Heft termed these focal tasks), are a source of error. Heft conducted a study in which he contrasted conscious reports (statements about reaching ability) with the control of action (reaching to pick up objects). Systematic errors in the conscious reports (i.e., inaccurate estimates of what was reachable) were found. On the other hand, the same participants performed accurately in the reaching task, that is, they reached for reachable objects, and did not reach for unreachable ones. Similarly, in a study on egocentric distance perception, Pagano and Bingham (1998) compared verbal estimates of distance with actual reaches. They found systematic errors in both conditions, but the verbal estimates of distance were less stable and less reliable than actual reaching. In addition, in the judgment condition, variable errors were at least twice as large as in the reaching condition. Pagano and Bingham argued that verbal estimates of perceived distance did not indicate much about the ability to reach accurately to a distance. Rather, and similar to Bootsma (1989) , they suggested that errors in the verbal report task occurred in the translation of perception into words.
An interesting study to report is one performed by Mark et al. (1997) who measured participants' judgments of the absolute and preferred critical boundary for reaching. In their Experiment 1A they asked participants to verbally judge reachability using a single degree of freedom reach (i.e., a reach that simply comprised extension of the arm), and found systematic overestimation (on average 12% and in the range reported in the literature above). In another task in the same experiment, the participants made free actual reaches which could include multi-degree of freedom reaches, that is, reaches that could include arm extension as well as bending forward at the waist and twisting at the back to extend the shoulder. It was found that participants started to include additional degrees of freedom before they had crossed the actual boundary of a single degree of freedom reach. This suggests that despite the participants' apparent overestimation in the verbal judgment of critical action boundaries of reaching, they are very accurate at judging the critical boundary for reaching when allowed to use an actual reach.
The Present Study
The presented evidence lends support to the hypothesis that there are discrepancies between conscious reports and the control of action as measures of perceptual performance. If an individual's primary task is to detect information appropriate to constrain those action degrees of freedom that are left unconstrained by the task situation, then conscious reports might be a crude reflection of actual perceptual accuracy. A primary purpose of the present study therefore was to determine whether the estimation errors found in studies on overhead reaching (Pepping & Li, 2000a , 2000b were caused by the use of a conscious report task as a measurement of perceptual performance. The first prediction of the current study therefore is that the perception of overhead reachability measured using a verbal response will reveal systematic estimation errors, whereas the use of an actual reaching response will not.
Reaction time can be interpreted as the time taken to identify the task-relevant information necessary to constrain the action dynamics. Reaction time is widely used in affordance research (cf. Michaels, 1988; Stins & Michaels, 1997a , 1997b . Typical reaction time with increased stimulus uncertainty varies for different tasks and for different participants. When task complexity increases, reaction time also increases. Interestingly, when the link between the perceptual and the response requirements of the task is more compatible, reaction time is reduced. Michaels (1988) reported an experiment in which participants had to intercept a computergenerated object that was approaching either the left or right hand. Participants typically reacted faster with the hand that could more easily intercept the object. Michaels (see also Michaels, 1989; Michaels, 1993; Stins & Michaels, 1997a , 1997b , 2000 argued that the information for some affordances might be faster or easier to detect and reaction time for those situations will be faster than in an afforded situation where the information is not that easy to discover. The second prediction of the current experiment is that if it is more meaningful or natural to make an action response than it is to make a verbal response then this will have an effect on the participants' reaction time when making the response.
Experiment
Participants were asked to indicate as quickly as possible whether they judged a stimulus, presented at different heights in the fronto-parallel plane above eye-height as reachable or not. Two overhead reaching tasks were used: a standing reach, as in reaching for a book on a bookshelf, and a reach-and-jump-as in jumping up and reaching for an object that is beyond the range of a standing reach.
Participants
Twenty healthy students (9 female, 11 male, mean age 19.8 years, age range 19-21 years) from the University of Birmingham School of Sport and Exercise Sciences participated as part of a course requirement. All participants had normal or corrected to normal vision. Informed consent was obtained in accordance with the policy statement of the local Research Ethics Committee.
Apparatus
The stimuli consisted of 46 horizontal lines of five equally interspaced red light emitting diodes (LEDs). The LEDs were mounted flush against the front of a matte black, 2 m wide × 4 m high aluminum plate. The diameter of each LED was 4 mm and the horizontal distance between each LED was 10 cm, making each horizontal LED line 40 cm wide. LED lines were placed at 2.5-cm intervals up to a height of 290 cm, starting at a height of 175 cm. Each LED line could be illuminated individually to present a single target line in the otherwise darkened experimental room.
To prevent the participants from receiving any feedback on whether their response was successful they wore PLATO liquid crystal display (LCD) spectacles, which could be opened and closed with good temporal precision (3-5 ms). The spectacles were electronically connected with two switches, a verbal response and an action response switch. The verbal response switch was activated using a microphone (Trantec series 3000, BBM Electronics Group, Ltd., Morden, Surrey), attached to their head using a headset and located approximately 2 cm in front of the participants' mouth. The microphone was linked to a computer using a Lafayette voice activated relay (model 10801, Lafayette Instruments, Loughborough, Leicestershire). The action response switch (a 20-cm long × 5-cm wide pad that was pressed by the participants prior to the start of a trial) was mounted at a height of 1 m (waist height) in front of the participant. Data acquisition was controlled by task-tailored software (written with LabVIEW) on a personal computer with an A/D interface card (sample frequency: 1000 Hz).
Procedure
At the start of each trial, participants stood 0.5 m in front of the black aluminum plate, wearing the LCD spectacles with the glasses closed. Both of the participant's hands rested on the action response switch. A loud beep (100 ms) indicated the start and end of a trial. At the first beep, the LCD glasses became transparent and one LED line was illuminated. Participants then judged as quickly as possible ("first hunch") whether the illuminated LED line was reachable.
Verbal Response Task. In the verbal response condition, the participants simply said "yes" or "no" if they judged the stimulus line as reachable. As soon as the participants responded, the verbal response switch was activated allowing reaction time to be measured (taken from the moment the LCD spectacles became transparent).
Action Response Task. In the action response condition, participants either reached for the line if they thought the line was reachable or lifted their hands and put them at either side of the action switch if they judged the line to be out of reach. Reaction time was measured as the time between the moment the LCD spectacles became transparent and the participants lifting their hands off the action response switch.
In both tasks the participants were given a 3-s time limit to respond. Trials in which participants did not respond in time were discarded. On activation of the verbal or action response switch the LED line was dimmed and the LCD spectacles became opaque. In between each trial there was a 1-s interval during which the LCD spectacles were opaque before the next trial would commence.
An adjusted staircase method (Levitt, 1970) , was used to assess perceived maximum reach height in each response mode by task condition. Put simply, the assessment consisted of a series of line height increments or decrements, i.e., either up or down. More precisely, after each response the height of the line was increased if the response was positive or decreased if it was negative, until a certain number of changes of response from yes to no or vice versa were obtained. In the very first line-height increment/decrement of each assessment, a step size of 10 cm was used, followed by an increment/decrement with a step size of 5 cm. Finally, 12 runs of line height increment/decrement of 2.5 cm were presented (the minimum step size, LED line heights were 2.5 cm interspaced). To prevent order effects on reaction time, after every response-based LED line, a random line (i.e., one that was not based on the previous response of the participants) was presented. After each randomly determined line, a response-based line was presented, etc. This method produced a variable number of trials per assessment (mean number of trials: 57.2; range: 39-89 trials). For every assessment, the height at which the line is judged as no longer reachable (50% negative or positive response) was calculated as the mean of the final 12 staircase-based, minimum step-size reversals. The reaction time at this height was calculated as the mean reaction time of the same final 12 staircase-based reversals.
Actual maximum reachable height was measured at the end of the experiment. Participants reached and reached-and-jumped three times, as high as they could, from the same initial position as during the assessment of perceived maximum reach height, with the LCD spectacles transparent. The highest LED line that the participants could reach with both hands was taken as maximum reachable height. In total, the experiment took approximately 1 hr.
Design and Variables Measured
Actual reach height was measured for both tasks and perceived reach height for each task × response mode combination. The response mode conditions were randomly assigned to two blocks of task conditions. The order of the task condition blocks was counterbalanced over all participants. Perceived reach height and reaction time were calculated as the mean of two assessments; once with the first LED line presented starting out of reach (stimulus height: 290 cm) and once with the first LED line presented starting within reach (stimulus height: 175 cm). The order in which these were presented was counterbalanced within each combination of response mode and task condition. Finally, action-scaled perceived reach height was calculated as the ratio of perceived and actual reach height for the two respective task conditions.
Results
Our aim was to determine whether response tasks (i.e., using a verbal response or an actual reach) influenced the perception of reachability (a) in terms of systematic error and (b) in terms of reaction time. First, action-scaled perceived reach height was analyzed using a two-way, within-participant ANOVA with task (two levels, reach and reach-and-jump) and response mode (two levels, verbal and action) as independent variables. The analysis only showed a simple main effect of task, F(1, 19) = 18.67, p < .05, explaining 50% of the variance (see also Figure 1 ). There was no effect of response mode, or an interaction between task and response mode. In the reach task, action-scaled perceived reach height was not significantly different from 1 in both the verbal response mode, t(19) = 0.70, and in the action response mode, t(19) = 0.25. This suggests that participants accurately perceived their action boundary for reaching in both response mode conditions. Action-scaled perceived reach height was significantly different, however, from 1 in the reach-and-jump task in both the verbal response mode, t(19) = -3.34, p < .05, and in the action response mode, t(19) = -4.31, p < .05. Participants significantly underestimated their action boundaries for reach and jumping in both response mode conditions.
The analysis of action-scaled perceived reach height confirms that in the reach condition participants accurately judged their action boundaries whereas the more dynamic reach-and-jump condition was characterized by systematic estimation errors. It seems that participants accurately judge the height they are able to reach, but they are quite conservative in judging their ability to reach and jump. Table 1 shows the actual and perceived maximum reach-height in the two task conditions. Participants underestimated by about 10 cm in the reach-and-jump condition, confirming the reported systematic errors reported in the literature. Interestingly, in the context of our hypothesis, this finding is independent of the way in which perceived reach height was measured. That is, response mode does not seem to influence the perception of reachability.
Next, reaction time, i.e., the time taken to organize and execute a response, in both response mode and task conditions was analyzed (see Table 2 ). A two-way, within-participant ANOVA with task and response mode as independent variables reveals simple main effects of task, F(1, 19) = 6.40, p < .05, explaining 25% of the variance, response mode, F(1, 19) = 127.60, p < .05, accounting for 87% of the variance, and an interaction effect of task × response mode, F(1, 19) = 5.64, p < .05, accounting for 23% of the variance. The simple main effect of task suggests that participants responded slower in the more dynamic reach-and-jump condition. More interestingly, the simple main effect of response mode shows that in both task conditions participants responded considerably slower when verbally responding as compared to when performing an actual reach. On average, participants responded 314 ms slower in the reach condition and 225 ms slower in the reach and jump. Finally, the interaction effect suggests that reaction time was differentially affected in the action response mode compared to the verbal response mode (see also Figure 2 ). To further investigate the interaction effect, separate one-way, within-participant ANOVA with task as independent variable were performed. The analysis showed that in the verbal response mode reaction time is not affected by task, F(1, 19) = 0.806, p = ns, whereas in the action response mode, reaction time is affected by task, F(1, 19) = 11.46, p < .05, accounting for 38% of the variance.
Hence, the time taken to organize and initiate a verbal response is unaffected by the task, i.e., whether it is a simple reach, or a more complex and dynamic reach and jump. An actual reach-and-jump response, on the other hand, takes longer to initiate than a simple reach. More interestingly in the context of our hypotheses, regardless of the task, participants take considerably longer to organize a verbal response to indicate reachability than they do to perform an actual reach.
Discussion
Estimation errors are a common finding in affordance studies. In this article, we suggest that estimation errors in the perception of overhead reachability are related to the way in which the perception of affordances is measured. In particular, it was hypothesized that verbal responses are a possible source of error when used as measures of perceptual performance. For this purpose, we tested whether response tasks, or, to be more precise, the use of a verbal response or an actual reach, would have an effect on the perception of reachability in terms of estimation error and reaction time.
First, it was predicted that the perception of overhead reachability measured using a verbal response would reveal systematic estimation errors, whereas the use of an actual reaching response would not. It was shown that participants perceived their action boundaries for overhead reaching reasonably well. They were very accurate in a standing reach task, and they slightly underestimated the height they could maximally reach in the reach-and-jump task. This was the case both in metric terms and in action-scaled terms. Interestingly, and of particular interest, there was no difference between perceived maximum reachable height measured using the verbal or using the action response mode, in either task. These results therefore do not confirm the predicted discrepancies between verbal and action measures as reported in previous studies (e.g., Heft, 1993; Pagano & Bingham, 1998) . The estimation errors in the present study cannot be attributed to the use of a conscious report task as a measurement of perceptual performance.
Second, it was predicted that reaction time would be different when making an action response than when making a verbal response. The results showed that participants needed less time to organize a simple reach than they did for a more dynamic reach-and-jump. More interestingly, the results showed that in both the reach and the reach-and-jump task participants responded considerably faster in the action response mode. In line with Hick's law, the results suggest that making a verbal response has less (stimulus-response) compatibility than making a relatively familiar action (reaching) response. That is, it could simply be less familiar to have to consciously judge action capabilities than it is to "just do it." Similarly, making a reasonably complicated reach-and-jump action response is less (stimulus-response) compatible than making a simpler and possibly more familiar standing reach response.
The reaction time results could shed light on the informational basis of verbal and action responses. Stins and Michaels (1997a) examined stimulus-response compatibility effects in two tasks with identical stimuli, an expanding or contracting square on a computer screen, but different responses. In one condition, participants responded to the display by pressing a button (i.e., a conscious report), while in the other condition they pushed or pulled a joystick as if to intercept the simulated object. The compatibility effects differed in the judgment and reaching tasks. Stins and Michaels argued that the information for the two tasks might have been different. Likewise, in the present study, the information used to organize and control the verbal response might have been different than the information used to organize and control the action response. Alternatively, the information might have been the same, but it is simply used in a different manner, depending on how the relationship between environment and performer is expressed. It is equally possible that for different response modes the same information is used. Because it is used for a different purpose, however, the manner in which it is detected is different. The taskspecific device (Bingham, 1988) for a verbal response might explore and identify the same information about reachability in a different way than the task-specific device for reaching, expressing itself in different reaction times. A fourth alternative could be that the verbal response is essentially the same as the action response, but requires something in addition to it. For instance, the verbal response could require a certain amount of time to identify task-relevant information and organize and prepare the action response, followed by an additional amount of time to organize and prepare the verbal judgment about the action response. Further research is needed to illuminate the exact nature and possible differences of the information used to constrain task dynamics of verbal versus action responses. Nevertheless, the processes involved in constraining the degrees of freedom involved in a verbal indication of reachability are likely to be of a different kind than those involved in constraining the actual act of reaching.
Affordances are generally defined in terms of a discrete task. For instance, in the case of sitting, a chair might or might not afford sitting on, depending on different chair and performer characteristics (Mark, 1987; Mark et al., 1990; Mark & Vogele, 1987) . Consequently, most studies have looked at mechanisms of perception of different affordances, or rather, perception of different critical action boundaries. It should be noted, though, that within a certain task, depending on how the task is defined, there are multiple nondiscrete regions in which particular environment and performer characteristics are of greater or lesser importance. For instance, in the case of overhead reaching, a performer will gradually include more degrees of freedom to effectively increase reaching capabilities as an object goes from within to out of reach; from stretching the arms and legs, to using tiptoes, to ultimately applying a jump. The discrete task of overhead reaching can, therefore, be subdivided into an infinite number of ways to achieve the overarching goal. The present study showed that different ways of achieving a certain affordance require a different amount of time to become realized and might require a different informational basis.
In the literature, dichotomous views regarding the role of affordances in perception and coordination of motor behavior have emerged. Gibson (1977; 1986) originally introduced affordances as the basis for perception and ongoing guidance of movements. The early work of Warren (1984) , however, has instigated a view that regards the primary role of affordances in perception and coordination as the basis for selecting between action modes. Warren's results have motivated a large body of research on preferred and maximum affordances for various actions. The focus in these studies is on preferred and maximum action boundaries; affordances are seen as mapping " … one-to-one onto specific modes of action that are tailored to realize them. For each affordance there exists a corresponding mode of action that will realize it" (Warren, 1988, p. 342) . In a recent paper, Stoffregen (2000) remarks that this emphasis on (preferred and maximum) action boundaries leads to the impression that the primary behavioral utility for affordances is for the selection of behaviors, rather than for the continuous control of action.
The present results show that the notions of preferred and maximum action boundaries should be viewed as special cases within regions of afforded behavior. An object that is within reaching distance affords reaching and is perceived as reachable (see, e.g., Carello et al., 1989; Pepping & Li, 2000a , 2000b Rochat & Wraga, 1997) . In this context, within reaching distance means being within the range of distances from the object, such that reaching is an appropriate action. This range of distances does not merely consist of preferred and maximum action boundaries for reaching. Rather, it consists of an infinite number of ways to accomplish the task of reaching, including preferred and maximum reaching. In other words, affordances do not just exist by means of the critical points in action space that emerge when environmental properties are scaled in action-relevant properties. Preferred and maximum action boundaries should be viewed as special cases rather than fundamental to the functional role of affordances.
The present study shows that individuals can be quite accurate at perceiving affordances for overhead reaching, but that they are less accurate at perceiving affordances for overhead reach and jumping. More research is required to determine exactly what causes this inaccuracy. The current findings clearly show that, in terms of reaction time, making verbal judgments about affordances is a very different task than actually acting on them. As such, for the purpose of investigating affordances and the perception of action capabilities, the use of verbal/conscious judgments as a measure of the perceptual performance should be carefully considered. Bootsma (1989) argued that the experimental task is often chosen based on availability or simplicity from the experimenters' point of view, rather than on behavioral considerations. Clearly, if it is the performer's primary task to detect information appropriate to constrain those action degrees of freedom that are left unconstrained by the task situation, then conscious reports might be a crude reflection of actual perceptual accuracy.
